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Abstract
[Schilcht 1975] and [Bourguignon 1981] studied the case of a convex sav-
ing function in the [Stiglitz 1969] model. They have shown that if one of the
two proportions of the rich or the poor is below a certain threshold, there is
a two-class equilibrium. However, they have only proved the existence of this
threshold. We give here a system of equations to calculate this threshold which
we interpret as the maximum proportion of rich for having a stable two-class
configuration. If the proportion of rich exceeds this threshold, the economy en-
ters a phase of decline although the golden-rule capital has not yet been reached.
This decline is due to a specific articulation between the rate of decrease in the
productivity of capital and the rate of increase in the depreciation of capital.
The mechanism of this decline recalls the description given in [Keynes 1936], of
the decline which happens when there is too much savings in an inegalitarian
context. This is an example of what is known as the "paradox of thrift". It
is remarkable that this paradox takes place in a neoclassical setting that does
not include key Keynesian elements such as saturation of demand, monetization
of savings, short-term eﬀects, expectation problems, involuntary unemployment
and rigidities. Numerical simulations are given to illustrate and analyze the
mechanisms involved.
Keywords : Paradox of Thrift, Inequality, Saving, Growth.
1 Introduction
[Schilcht 1975] and [Bourguignon 1981] studied the case of a convex relation-
ship between savings and income in the [Stiglitz 1969] model. The purpose of
the Stiglitz model was to show the influence of income and wealth distribu-
tion on economic growth and on the convergence of social classes. Although
there is no evidence of the convex or non-convex nature of the relationship be-
tween savings and income at the aggregate level, at the individual and static
level the convexity hypothesis is the most likely [Dynan-Skinner-Zeldes 2004,
Boushey-Hersh 2012]. Therefore, the present study is based on this hypothe-
sis of convexity. [Schilcht 1975] has shown that if this hypothesis is adopted
instead of the concavity or linearity of the relationship between individual sav-
ings and income, and if the proportion of one of the social classes is less than
a certain threshold, the convergence of social classes no longer takes place and
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the system evolves towards an inegalitarian equilibrium with two social classes.
Therefore, the spontaneous and generally observable trend towards a rich / poor
social structure rather than an egalitarian structure is further confirmation of
the convexity hypothesis. [Bourguignon 1981] shows that under this hypothesis,
inegalitarian equilibria Pareto-dominate the egalitarian equilibrium.
In this paper we give a system of equations which allows calculating this
threshold and we interpret it as the maximum proportion of rich to have a
stable two-class configuration. If the proportion of rich people exceeds this
threshold, the economy enters a phase of decline.
The purpose of this paper is also to examine in detail this decline in the light
of the description in [Keynes 1936] of the economic decline caused by an excess
of savings in a context of inequality.
We begin in section 2 by presenting the characteristics of the model and the
main results obtained by [Schilcht 1975] and [Bourguignon 1981]. We mostly
keep the notations and method of [Bourguignon 1981].
In Section 3, we give the equations for calculating the maximal sustainable
proportion of rich (MSPOR). We calculate the MSPOR from numerical values
proposed for the rate of capital depreciation and for production and saving
functions. The calculation is carried out for diﬀerent values of the propensity to
save. These numerical values are also used for the following sections to illustrate
the findings.
In Section 4, we analyze the dynamics of the decline. Given a certain re-
semblance to the description in [Keynes 1936], we refer to it as the "Keynesian
decline".
We then discuss the following questions:
- How does the equilibrium of the economy behave according to the distrib-
ution of wealth? (Section 5) This section shows that a tiny proportion of rich
people makes it possible to push a locked economy into insuﬃcient savings and
egalitarian poverty towards a level close to the golden-rule. On the other hand,
it also shows that the increase in this proportion is harmful.
- How does equilibrium behave according to the propensity to save, for a
given distribution of wealth? (Section 6). This section highlights the phe-
nomenon of "paradox of thrift" although the model does not include strictly
Keynesian elements, such as saturation of demand, monetization of savings,
short-term eﬀects, expectation problems, unemployment and rigidities.
Section 7 concludes and presents possible directions for further study.
2 Notation and main features of the model
Wemainly use the assumptions, notations, method and results of [Bourguignon 1981].
The economy is represented by a per capita production function () where
 is the average capital per capita.  is increasing, concave and twice diﬀeren-
tiable. Individual savings are assumed to depend on income according to the
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function () where  is the income of the individual concerned.  is convex,
increasing, diﬀerentiable and checks lim→∞0() = 1.
The capital undergoes depreciation at a rate  per unit of time and capital.
This depreciation plays the same role as population growth in [Bourguignon 1981].
We have thought that it would be more appropriate, in modern economic con-
ditions, to speak of depreciation of capital rather than demography. But the
interpretation of  as a population growth rate remains valid.
We assume that the economy has a unique stable egalitarian equilibrium
0. Mathematically, this condition is equivalent to saying that 0 is the unique
solution of the equation (()) =  and that 0((0)) 0(0)   .
We denote by ∗ the per capita capital of the golden-rule defined by
 0(∗) = 
The society is composed of 2 classes: the poor, in proportion 1 and the
rich in proportion 2 = 1− 1. In a theoretical perspective, this assumption is
not restrictive because the convexity of saving implies that the equilibrium has
at most two classes [Bourguignon 1981]. In the spirit of the present study, the
concept of "poor class" includes the middle class. Consequently, the poor class
is the majority. So, we have 2  1. We will assume this for all the following.
The capital stock per capita is 1 for the poor and 2 for the rich. The average
per capita capital therefore satisfies  = 11 + 22.
As stated by the neoclassical theory of distribution, capital is paid for ac-
cording to its marginal productivity. The remuneration of per capita capital is
therefore:  0(). By deduction, the per capita wage is ()−  0(). All in-
dividuals receive the same payment in exchange for their contributions to work,
i.e. () −  0(). For capital, individuals are remunerated according to the
shares of capital they hold. Thus, an individual of class  (with  = 1 or 2)
receives  0() in exchange for his contribution to capital. Moreover, he bears
the share of the depreciation of the capital he owns: .
The equation of capital evolution for class  is therefore
· =  [()−  0() +  0()]− 
The equilibrium is thus characterized by the following 3 equations for the 3
unknowns 1 2 and :
 [() + (1 − ) 0()]− 1 = 0 (1)
 [() + (2 − ) 0()]− 2 = 0
 = 11 + 22
Denote  the inverse function of . We have
 0  1  00  0
and
lim 0() =
→∞
1
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Let () be the curve in the space ( ) defined by the equation :
 [() + (− ) 0()] = 
or, equivalently:
() + (− ) 0() =  ()
The curve () intersects the line ( = ) at the points satisfying () =
 (). By assumption, this equation is verified only in 0. Therefore the curve
() intersects the line ( = ) only in 0.
[Bourguignon 1981] shows that a necessary condition for an equilibrium with
two social classes is 0  ∗. In this case and for  ∈ [0 ∗[ he establishes that
the equation ()+ (− ) 0() =  () admits two solutions 1() and 2()
such that 1() 6  and 2()  . These two solutions are candidates for per
capita capital values of the two social classes at equilibrium.
All details and justifications concerning the elaboration of the curve (), the
phase plan and the dynamics of the system can be found in [Bourguignon 1981].
We have reproduced here the notations of [Bourguignon 1981] in order to facil-
itate the consultation of this reference at the same time as the present paper.
We assume for all the following that the condition 0  ∗ is checked because
without it all social classes would necessarily converge. Indeed, in continuity
with the work of [Schilcht 1975] and [Bourguignon 1981], our concern is to study
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the consequences of a persistent inequality, a pattern that seems to be more
realistic.
If we consider the production parameters as given (i.e. the production func-
tion and the depreciation coeﬃcient) then the position of 0 with respect to ∗
depends on the saving behavior, that is, on the function . The intuitive eco-
nomic interpretation of the condition 0  ∗ is that the poor class, if it where
alone, would not have the suﬃcient saving propensity to reach the golden-rule
2.
Defining the function () by the equation (1−())1()+()2() = ,
[Bourguignon 1981] shows that  is positive and continuous over ]0 ∗[, that
(0) = 0 and lim→∗() = 0. It follows that () admits a maximum on ]0 
∗[
denoted , and that under the condition 0  ∗, for a stable inegalitarian
equilibrium to exist, we must have inf(1 2)  . This condition is also
suﬃcient3 and the inegalitarian equilibrium Pareto-dominates the egalitarian
equilibrium.
Since we have assumed 2  1, the necessary and suﬃcient condition be-
comes 2  . Let us observe that the social class which was initially poor
will never be able to surpass the rich class. Indeed, assuming that the system
inverts the situations along the way, then, by continuity of the state variables 1
and 2, it would be necessary that at a certain date these two variables become
equal. Equations (1) show that these two variables would then always remain
equal from this date on.
We deduce that 2 constitutes the proportion of the rich class at the begin-
ning and at the end. One can therefore reformulate the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the existence of a stable inegalitarian equilibrium by saying that
the proportion of rich must be less than .
3 The maximal sustainable proportion of rich
If the proportion of rich exceeds , [Bourguignon 1981] shows that there can be
only an egalitarian equilibrium Pareto-dominated by the inegalitarian equilibria
achievable with proportions of rich less than . As soon as the proportion of rich
exceeds , we will see that the economy ends up being trapped in a decline.
For this reason we refer to  as the maximal sustainable proportion of rich
(MSPOR).
In this section we establish a system of equations for calculating  . Then,
as example, diﬀerent values of  corresponding to diﬀerent values of certain
parameters are calculated.
2This intuitive interpretation of 0  ∗ entails that 0 increases with the saving propen-
sity, what is checked in all the following. The precise definition of the saving propensity is
given in next section.
3 In fact, Bourguignon asserts that inf(1 2) 6  is a necessary and suﬃcient condition,
but if inf(1 2) = , the stability is lost.
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To calculate , we start from the system (1) replacing 2 by (). From
now on, it is assumed that the system (1) is smooth enough for the functions
1() 2() and () to be diﬀerentiable. Then we derive the 3 equations with
respect to  and we write that  = 0.
We have
 = (1−())1 +()2
Deriving with respect to , we get:
1 = ()(2 − 1) + (2 − 1)

 +
1

We write that  = 0 at , which gives:
 = 1−
1
2
 − 1
(2)
Furthermore, the derivatives of 1 and 2 with respect to  are obtained by
deriving the first two equations of the system (1):
1
 =
”()(1 − )
 0(1)−  0() (3)
2
 =
”()(2 − )
 0(2)−  0() (4)
Lastly, the third equation of the system (1) provides:
 =  − 12 − 1 (5)
We obtain equations (2) to (5) for the unknowns: 1  2   and . By
adding the first two equations of the system (1), we obtain 6 equations for the
6 unknowns 1 2 1  2   and .
It is noteworthy that the value of  depends only on the production function,
the rate of depreciation and the saving function, and not on the initial state of
the economy (i.e. initial capital and wealth distribution).
Since there is no explicit formula for , we have thought useful to take
numerical values for these 3 data (production function, depreciation rate and
saving function) to illustrate our point and get an idea of the order of magnitude
of  for these numerical values. It is not argued that the following calculations
express the actual situation of a particular country4.
The production function is chosen so that the marginal productivity of cap-
ital can decrease rapidly. The choice is a Cobb-Douglas with a share of the
capital income equal to 0.3. The parameters of the production function have
been adjusted so that the capital coeﬃcient is 2.5 for an average per capita
4The model is still at the rudimentary stage to lend itself to empirical work.
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income normalized to 1. Consequently, the production function per capita is
() = 3403.
An analytic form has been adjusted for the individual saving function to
ensure that it is increasing, convex and that the limit of the marginal propensity
to save equal to 1:
() = + 1
2
(1 + )( − ) + 1− 
1 + 
s
0 +
∙
1
2
(1 + )( − )
¸2
This form checks the requested conditions. The coeﬃcients    and 0 are
adjusted to have the following values for individual savings rates at diﬀerent
levels of income:
income 0.1 1 1.5 2
savings rate 7% 15% 20% 30%
By minimizing the sum of the absolute values of the deviations, the adjusted
values for    and 0 are:
 = 17105249
 = 00255809
 = 00677230
0 = 01889504
The term "social propensity to save" is used hereafter to indicate the general
state of mind of society about the willingness to save. If function  represents
the saving behavior, the change in the level of the social propensity to save can
be obtained by the form:
() = 1()
The variation of the coeﬃcient  thus represents the variation of the overall
willingness to save of society (see the following graph). If  increases, the
willingness to save increases.  is referred to as the "social propensity to save".
It is obvious, however, that the variation of the coeﬃcient  can not in itself
represent all the possibilities of modifying the profile of the willingness to save.
For example, one can think of an increase in the willingness to save among the
poor at the same time as a decrease among the rich. Such a change is not
captured by the parameter  and is not considered in the present study.
If   1 the propensity to save increases for all incomes. It decreases if
  1:
income 0.1 1 1.5 2
savings rate with  = 12 7.8% 16.7% 25.3% 37.1%
savings rate with  = 08 5.8% 13.6% 16.7% 21.8%
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We obtain the following curves that give the individual savings rate as a
function of income for  = 08  = 1 and  = 12:
S ( y )
S ( 1 .2 y ) / 1 .2
S ( 0 .8 y ) / 0 .8
Lastly, the annual capital depreciation rate is set at 3.7%.
With the various parameters specified above, the following results for  as
a function of  are obtained by computer:
 1 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8
 5.44% 1.33% 4.45% 5.35% 4.85%
We see that the MSPOR  decreases quite sharply if the social propensity
to save increases from the reference situation  = 1.
For each value of  and with a proportion of rich equal to , values of per
capita and per class capital and output at inegalitarian equilibrium are given as
well as per capita capital and output at egalitarian equilibrium:
 1 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8
average per capita capital 8.89 11.75 9.89 8.29 7.86
average per capita income 1.44 1.57 1.49 1.41 1.39
per capita capital of the poor 6.51 10.73 7.98 5.62 5.01
per capita capital of the rich 50.2 87.5 50.86 55.53 63.72
per capita income of the poor 1.33 1.53 1.41 1.28 1.24
per capita income of the rich 3.46 4.61 3.35 3.83 4.36
per capita capital at egalitarian equilibrium 6.25 10.66 7.77 5.35 4.75
per capita income at egalitarian equilibrium 1.30 1.53 1.39 1.24 1.2
per capita capital at the golden-rule 13.18 13.18 13.18 13.18 13.18
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We see that the best situation for both the poor and the rich is the situation
 = 12, where the social propensity to save is high and the proportion of
wealthy low. The most damaging situation for the poor is the situation  = 08
where the social propensity to save is low and the proportion of rich is quite
high.
We now give the savings rates () at equilibrium by social class and for
society as a whole, for each value of .
 1 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8
savings rate of the poor 18.1% 26% 21% 16.3% 15%
savings rate of the rich 53.7% 70.2% 56.2% 53.6% 54%
aggregate savins rate 22.7% 27.7% 24.5% 21.7% 20.9%
We see that, apart from the case  = 12, the aggregate savings rates are
relatively close. However, the social propensities to save, individual savings rates
and equilibrium incomes diﬀer significantly. In fact the aggregate savings rate
is a parameter which, considered alone, does not reflect the saving behavior.
Other characteristics are important such as the level of average income, the
distribution of wealth and income, or the position in the accumulation process
(more or less close to equilibrium). For example, the aggregate savings rate
may increase due to a higher concentration of income while the average income
falls. This may explain the inconclusive results of the studies on the relationship
between aggregate savings rates and income [Dynan-Skinner-Zeldes 2004]. But
it should not be concluded that at the individual level, the savings rate does
not increase as income increases.
4 The Keynesian decline
We are interested here in what happens when the proportion of rich exceeds
. After a period of growth, the economy declines towards the egalitarian
configuration which happens to be Pareto-dominated by inegalitarian equilibria,
as showed by [Bourguignon 1981]. We try to see the mechanisms of this decline
through a numerical example.
The parameters of the section 3 are used again: production function, saving
function with  = 1 and depreciation rate. The following figure shows the phase
plan if we take a proportion of rich of 3%, less than the MSPOR which is 5.44%
for  = 1. The initial per capita capital of the rich class is given the values
02 = 5 and 6 then 100, and the initial per capita capital of the poor class the
value 01 = 06. The following trajectories (in green) are obtained:
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We observe that if 02 = 6, the economy is freed from from the path to the
poor egalitarian equilibrium and grows towards the rich inegalitarian equilib-
rium. Whereas if one begins with 02 = 5, the income of the rich class is not
suﬃcient to allow a saving capable to release the economy from the path of
egalitarian poverty. This conclusion is not surprising. It is consistent with the
intuition that capital weakness can trap the economy into poverty.
It is less immediate to admit that an excess of capital can lead to trapping
the economy in poverty. Yet, if we take a proportion of rich above the MSPOR,
this is what we observe. This is the case that is interesting to analyze.
We take 2 = 6%. The curves
n ·1 = 0o and n ·2 = 0o intersect only in the
poor egalitarian equilibrium. The following trajectory is obtained for 02 = 50
and 01 = 0 8:
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In this setting, the rich begin with a per capita capital of 50. They then
climb to more than 90 to finally plummet to 625 which is the capital per capita
of the poor egalitarian equilibrium. The poor also experience a drop at the end
of the trajectory from 690 to 625. But this decline is less marked and the
overall balance is positive for them: from 08 to 625.
To understand the reason for this decline, we are interested in what governs
the capital dynamics for the rich, that is, their savings on the one hand and the
depreciation of their capital on the other.
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time axis (years)
capital depreciation
of the rich
savings of 
the rich
At the start, both classes take advantage of the existence of inequality. In-
deed, the poor benefit from a good level of production made possible by the
capital of the rich, whereas the rich profit from a good productivity of their
capital thanks to the labor of the poor, or in other words, thanks to a still
modest macroeconomic capital per capita ratio. The economy is growing con-
siderably.
This strong growth has the eﬀect of an increase in the capital stock and a
rapid decline in capital marginal productivity. This decline doubly aﬀects the
income of the rich in comparison with the case of an equal distribution of wealth.
Indeed, it curbs the increase in production, as is also the case in an egalitarian
society where capital stock is growing. But in addition to this, it diminishes the
income share of the wealthy acquired through the existence of inequalities.
In the above graph, the income and savings of the rich begin to decline
after about 20 years. However, their savings remain abundant. Their capital
therefore continues to rise and it begins to fall only after about 50 years of the
date of the decline in income. This discrepancy is the cause of an excessive
accumulation which leads to a situation where it is no longer possible to cover
the depreciation of capital by saving. The decline then begins and it is no
longer recoverable. In fact, this dynamic depends on the comparison between
12
the decline in the productivity of capital and the increase in the depreciation of
capital. It should be noted that at the macroeconomic level, average per capita
capital does not reach the golden-rule stage beyond which capital productivity
falls below depreciation rate. Thus, inequality makes the economic growth stop
before reaching the golden-rule stage. But it will be seen below (section 5) that
inequality can also make it possible to approach the golden-rule by compensating
the weakness of the savings of the poor class.
Thus the initial abundance of wealth is the very cause of subsequent decline.
A smaller proportion of rich in the beginning could have delayed capital growth
and marginal productivity decline so that the economy stabilizes without tum-
bling into poverty, as the case 2 = 3% shows.
The mechanism of this decline reminds one of the description in [Keynes 1936],
of the decline that occurs when there is too much unevenly distributed wealth.
That’s what he calls "the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty, where exces-
sive wealth and saving of the rich can lead to a decline in both aggregate wealth
and savings" [Keynes 1936, chapter 3, section II]. In this regard, he asserts that:
“. . . the richer the community, the wider will tend to be the gap
between its actual and its potential production; and therefore the
more obvious and outrageous the defects of the economic system.
For a poor community will be prone to consume by far the greater
part of its output, so that a very modest measure of investment will
be suﬃcient to provide full employment; whereas a wealthy commu-
nity will have to discover much ampler opportunities for investment
if the saving propensities of its wealthier members are to be compat-
ible with the employment of its poorer members. If in a potentially
wealthy community the inducement to invest is weak, then, in spite
of its potential wealth, the working of the principle of eﬀective de-
mand will compel it to reduce its actual output, until, in spite of its
potential wealth, it has become so poor that its surplus over its con-
sumption is suﬃciently diminished to correspond to the weakness of
the inducement to invest.”
The decline in investment opportunities in this paragraph of Keynes corre-
sponds in the present model to declining productivity as capital accumulation
progresses. However, there is no question of capital depreciation in this para-
graph of Keynes, but of underemployment.
Other elements generally present in Keynesian economics, such as demand-
driven economy, monetization of savings, short-term eﬀects, expectation prob-
lems and rigidities, are not included in the present model of neoclassical essence.
It is remarkable that, despite this, the decline does occur anyway.
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5 The proportion of rich and the aggregate sav-
ings rate
A number of economists share the view that greater inequality, by shifting in-
come toward more saving agents, increases the aggregate savings rate, thus
accelerating capital accumulation and growth. This idea can be found, for ex-
ample, in [Barro 2000].
On the contrary, more recent opinions reconnect with the vision expressed in
Keynes‘s quote (section 4) and attribute a less positive role to inequalities with
respect to their impact on the economy and consequently saving [Stiglitz 2011,
Ostry-Berg-Tsangarides 2014].
It should be noted that what is generally referred to as "inequality" is meant
to describe a situation with a large income gap between rich and poor. This con-
cept of inequality is not only dependent on the proportion of rich. It can evolve
even in the opposite direction to the proportion of rich if one keeps personal in-
comes constant and if one measures inequality by the Gini index. However, this
section only examines the relationship between the proportion of rich and the ag-
gregate savings rate, what is nevertheless a topical issue as the number of billion-
aires has doubled since 2008 financial crisis [Oxfam report “Even It Up” 2014].
Within the present framework, we show that if we start from an egalitarian
situation and introduce a tiny proportion of rich people, the aggregate savings
rate at equilibrium improves significantly. But if we start from a situation where
there are already some rich people, the addition of new rich people deteriorates
the income and the aggregate savings rate at equilibrium.
[Bourguignon 1981] shows that, for a given proportion of rich 2 satisfying
0  2  , the possible equilibria are pairs (1 2) each consisting of an un-
stable equilibrium 1 and a stable equilibrium 2 with 2  1. We deduce that
the equilibrium determined by e(2) = sup {() = 2} is a stable equilib-
rium. As stated in [Bourguignon 1981], the equilibrium e Pareto-dominates all
the other equilibria where the proportion of rich is 2.
Let us show that the equilibrium capital e(2) and the aggregate savings
rate are decreasing as functions of 2 as long as 2  0:
At equilibrium, aggregate savings are necessarily equal to the depreciation
of the total capital:
 = e
The aggregate savings rate as a function of e is therefore (e) = () . It is
easily checked that (e) is an increasing function of e because  is concave and
positive. We now prove that e(2) is a decreasing function of 2, which will
establish the decrease of the aggregate savings rate  as a function of 2.
Suppose not. There would be two real numbers   in ]0 1[ such that   ,
which would check e()  e() or e() = e(). Suppose e()  e(). Define
the function () = () −  on the interval
he() ∗i. The function () is
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assumed to be continuous on [0 ∗] (by setting (∗) = 0 - for the definition
and properties of A, see sections 2 and 3).
We have (e()) = (e())− = −  0 and (∗) = (∗)− = −  0.
The function  being continuous, there would exist  in
he() ∗i such that
() = 0. We would have ()−  = 0, with  > e()  e(). This contradicts
the definition of e() = sup {() = }. We thus have e() > e(). In fact,
we have e()  e(). Indeed, since  is continuous, we have (e()) = . If
we suppose e() = e(), then (e()) = (e()), which implies  =  and
contradicts   . QED
We now show that the limit of e(2) when 2 → 0 is ∗:
Since the function e() is decreasing, it has a limit when 2 → 0. We show
that this limit is ∗. Consider an increasing sequence  which tends to ∗ from
the left. Denote  = (). The function  being positive on ]0 ∗[ and
continuous on [0 ∗], the sequence  is positive and tends to 0. Moreovere() > . So e()→ ∗, what shows that the limit of e when 2 tend to 0
from the right is ∗. QED
Therefore, when the proportion of rich decreases, the average per capita
capital tends to the golden-rule level, where the average net income is maximum.
The limit of the aggregate savings rate is the golden-rule’s savings rate (∗) =
∗
(∗) . In the Cobb-Douglas case, this rate is equal to the share of capital, which
is 03 in our numerical simulation.
It is remarkable that this result does not depend on the saving function,
provided it is increasing and convex. It should be noted that in our inegali-
tarian economy, this rate does not correspond to the individual savings rates.
The poor save less and the rich save much more. But it happens that capital
is distributed mechanically during the growth process so that the equilibrium
approaches spontaneously the golden-rule.
However, while it is true that the decline in the proportion of rich increases
the aggregate savings rate and brings the economy closer to the golden-rule,
the total suppression of the rich reduces this rate and drops the economy in a
situation Pareto-dominated by all the inegalitarian situations.
In the case  = 1, the following graphs represent the aggregate savings
rate, the ratios of income and capital between rich and poor as functions of the
proportion of rich 2:
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a2
aggregate savings rate at equilibrium as a function of a2
a2
ratio of income between rich and poor at equilibrium as a function of a2
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a2
ratio of capital between rich and poor at equilibrium as a function of a2
The relationship between the aggregate savings rate at equilibrium and the
proportion of rich is thus contrary to the immediate impression that wealth
increases savings. This finding supports the idea, suggested by Keynes’s quote
(section 4), that excessive wealth creates poverty. However, it does not advocate
egalitarianism since it also shows that a suﬃciently small proportion of rich
makes it possible to approach the level of savings of the golden-rule and to
rescue the economy from egalitarian poverty.
6 The paradox of thrift
What has been called "Keynesian decline" presupposes that above a certain
point, saving plays a counterproductive role. This phenomenon is known as the
"paradox of thrift". According to [Keynes 1936, Chapter 23, Section VII], the
existence of this paradox has been the subject of controversy between econo-
mists. Indeed, it is not easy to admit that abundance can create scarcity when
one is accustomed to reasoning in terms of supply-demand balance.
[Keynes 1936, Chapter 23, Section VII] presents the fable of the bees of
Mandeville where he sought to explain the counterproductive eﬀect of an excess
of savings, as well as the hostile reactions of some English authors of the 18th
century. Still according to [Keynes 1936], controversy continued in the 19th
century between Ricardo and Malthus in the form of a debate on the possibility
of a situation of overproduction, which amounts to a debate on the paradox of
thrift. Indeed, if there is overproduction, there is under-consumption therefore
over-saving. After the First World War, Hayek and Schumpeter stood up against
the paradox contrary to Keynes [Hayek 1931, Earley 1994]. Today, opinions
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still seem to be divided. On the side of the paradox, we find for example
[Krugman 2009] and the septic side we find [Barro 2000].
In this section we examine numerically the relationship between the social
propensity to save and the average income at equilibrium, the propensity of
rich being fixed. The social propensity to save  varies from 08 to 12. The
proportion of rich is 2 = 3%. We obtain the following graph for the equilibrium
net income  = ()− :
social propensity to save
net income at equilibrium
income increases 
with the propensity 
to save
income 
decreases with 
the propensity to 
save
inequality equality
We observe that there is an optimal value for the social propensity to save
∗ = 1 064 (with a maximum error of 10−3). The net equilibrium income for
 = ∗ is then  = 1 1356. This income is slightly less than the net income
of the golden-rule ∗ = 1 1380. But it is much higher than the egalitarian net
income for  = ∗, which is 0(∗) = 1 0880.
Beyond ∗and before reaching  = 1 155 net income declines although
the economy remains in the inegalitarian and rich part. At  = 1 155, the
economy crashes sharply in the egalitarian and poor area. It looks like the
Marxist transition from capitalism to socialism, but without the class struggle!
To recover once in the egalitarian structure, it would require a social propensity
to save of about  = 1 26, what means an increase in aggregate savings rate
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from 23% to 30%. Also observe that the decline in the inegalitarian situation
begins at (∗) = 11 652, whereas in the egalitarian situation it begins only
when the economy is overaccumulated, i.e. when capital exceeds the golden-
rule level ∗ = 13 182
To sum up, if the social propensity to save is not very high (less than ∗),
the introduction of a proportion of rich by 3% makes it possible to significantly
exceed the egalitarian net income and to approach the net income of the golden-
rule. But this gain may quickly vanish if the social propensity to save increases.
7 Conclusion
This study highlighted one aspect of the consequences of inequality on the
macroeconomic relationship between savings and income in a basic neoclassical
model. Inequality is at the same time useful and harmful. It is useful because
it makes it possible to achieve an aggregate income out of reach if the savings
of the majority class is insuﬃcient. It is harmful in the sense that it renders the
economic equilibrium that it has achieved fragile. Indeed, the economy risks a
great decline if the size of the rich class or the social propensity to save exceeds
certain thresholds. This decline is due to a specific articulation between the
rate of decline in the productivity of capital and the rate of increase in the de-
preciation of capital. The dynamics of such a decline reminds one of Keynes’s
description of the consequences of excess savings in a context of inequality. It is
noteworthy that this decline takes place in a neoclassical model that does not
include key Keynesian elements such as saturation of demand, monetization
of savings, short-term eﬀects, expectation problems, involuntary unemployment
and rigidities. It is remarkable that, despite this, the decline does occur anyway.
The following directions should be further explored: taking into account
taxation, technical progress, imperfect competition and rent seeking behavior.
References
[Barro 2000] Barro R.J. (2000), “Inequalities and
Growth in a Panel of Countries”, R.J.
Journal of Economic Growth 5(1) 5-32,
doi:10.1023/A:1009850119329
[Boushey-Hersh 2012] Boushey H., Hersh A.S. (2012), “The
American Middle Class, Income In-
equality and the Strength of Our Econ-
omy”, Center for American Progress,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
19
economy/reports/2012/05/17/11628/the-
american-middle-class-income-inequality-
and-the-strength-of-our-economy/
[Bourguignon 1981] Bourguignon F. (1981), “Pareto-Superiority
of Unegalitarian Equilibria in Stiglitz’
Model of Wealth Distribution With Con-
vex Saving Function”, Econometrica, vol.
49, N◦6
[Dynan-Skinner-Zeldes 2004] Dynan K.E., Skinner J. , Zeldes S.P. (2004),
“Do The Rich Save More?”, Journal of Po-
litical Economy, vol 112, n◦2, 397-444
[Earley 1994] Earley J.S. (1994), “Schumpeter and
Keynes, Dissimilar Twin Revolution-
ists”, History Economics Review, vol
21, issue 1, 21-33, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/10370196.1994.11733147
[Keynes 1936] Keynes J.M. (1936), "General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money",
http://cas.umkc.edu/economics/ peo-
ple/facultypages/kregel/courses/econ645/
winter2011/generaltheory.pdf
[Krugman 2009] Krugman P. (2009), “The Paradox of Thrift
- for Real”, New York Times 7/7/2009
[Ostry-Berg-Tsangarides 2014] Ostry D. J., Berg A., Tsangarides C.
G. (2014), “Redistribution, Inequal-
ity and Growth”, IMF discussion note,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/
2014/sdn1402.pdf
[Oxfam report “Even It Up” 2014] Oxfam report (2014), “Even It Up”,
http://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/
oxfam/bitstream/10546/333012/43/cr-
even-it-up-extreme-inequality-291014-
en.pdf
[Schilcht 1975] Schilcht E. (1975), “A Neoclassical Theory
of Wealth Distribution”, Jahrbücher für Na-
tionalökonomie und Statistik, 189, 78-96
[Stiglitz 1969] Stiglitz J. (1969), “Distribution of Income
and Wealth Among Individuals” Economet-
rica, 37, 382-3997
20
[Stiglitz 2011] Stiglitz J. (2011), “To Cure the
Economy”, Project Syndicate,
https://www.projectsyndicate.org/print/
tocuretheeconomy
[Hayek 1931] Von Hayek F. A. (1931), “The Paradox of
Saving”, Economica, n◦32, 125-169
21
